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ABSTRACT 
The most important variable in a decision making situation 
is the role of information. On the strength of information 
received, choice between competing alternatives is made. 
One decision making situation that receives intense 
scrutiny, and is a subject of much debate is the passage o~ 
bills into laws. Legislative decisions are arrived at in a 
highly charged political environment. This paper explores 
the role of information and informants in the legislators' 
institutional and environmental arena, and the personal 
characteristics of the legislators that influence the 
decision making process. 
The proceedings of the 89th Illinois General Assembly 
was observed and the data analyzed from the perspective of 
the legislators and lobbyists. 
The study reveals that the structural aspects of the 
legislative environment play a significant factor in 
influencing the lawmakers' decisions. Legislators rely 
most on insider sources of information with peer influence 
playing the most important role. Legislators turn to 
colleagues, specifically, committee members for 
knowledgeable and trusted information. Legislators select 
information that is congruent with their experiences, belief 
system and attitudes. Personal attributes together with 
colleagues who validate those ideologies held by the 
legislator, thus, becomes the contributing factor in 
I 
influencing legislative strategies. 
Politically relevant information, that is information 
received from constituents, media, and leadership is also 
utilized. These agents have the power to influence the 
political goals of the elected officials. Source valence 
is, therefore, relatively high in the legislative 
environment. Policy information is not extensively sought 
by the legislators as the credibility of the source is 
transferred to the message. 
Lobbyists, however, have a personal stake in the 
passage of a particular piece of legislation. They seek and 
provide thorough information. Lobbyists view themselves as 
an influencing force promoting legislation, while lawmakers 
view lobbyists as only informational providers. 
Decision making in the legislative environment is a 
complex activity. The flow of information is 
multidirectional, and the manner in which legislators make 
decisions is conditional on the individual legislator's 
personal attributes, the institutional characteristics, and 
the environmental factors. 
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Legislative Decision Making 1 
CHAPTER I. 
In the age of information overflow, possessing concise, 
accurate, and timely information is the key to influence, 
power, and decision making. One typical decision making 
situation is the passage of bills into laws. This process 
is the function of the Congress and the state legislatures. 
The lawmakers deliberate, debate, and vote on a variety of 
issues. These decisions are made in a highly charged 
political environment. The two invaluable elements that are 
required for making informed decisions involve investment of 
time and effort (Kingdon, 1973; Mondak 1993). It is within 
these constraints that the lawmakers function. It is, 
therefore, of utmost importance to understand how lawmakers 
prioritize, form, and shape various laws. To what stimuli 
do the Illinois legislators' respond when they make their 
decisions? Factors that influence a person's decision 
making are discussed in the following sections. 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE. 
Theories On Decision Making: 
Radford (1989) defines decision making as making 
effective choices between alternatives based on the 
situation and the decision maker's objective. On the 
strength of information that one receives, choice between 
competing alternatives is made. The most important 
activity, therefore, in the decision making process is the 
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gathering of information. Information can be a rather 
nebulous term. Information has been defined as "a news 
report, an opinion, an idea, or a comment relating to a 
specific topic" (Lin, 1971, p. 35) . For the purposes of 
this study, information in the legislative environment is 
also defined as any data, message, or research pertaining to 
bills and amendments. 
A number of factors influence the acceptance of 
information by legislators. The first factor is grounded in 
cognitive psychology and suggests how an individual seeks 
and processes information depends on the person's level of 
involvement. Petty and Cacioppo's Elaboration Likelihood 
Model (ELM) (Gelinas-Chebat & Charles-Chebat, 1992; Laczniak 
& Muehling, 1993) states that when the person's involvement 
with the message is high, the individual will engage in a 
rational processing of the message (central route) . 
Individuals in low involvement condition will process 
information with less effort based on their likes and 
dislikes (peripheral route) . Thus depending on the 
individual's motivation, ability, and opportunity to process 
the message, his/her attitude will be formed and/or changed 
according to the information received. 
The second factor focuses on how an individual selects 
information. Petelle and Maybee (1974) state that human 
beings process information based on the "environmental 
stimuli" and that individuals bank on their "background of 
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experiences" (p.190). The researchers argue that this 
pattern of behavior reduces complexities in the environment. 
It eliminates the need of constant learning, and enables 
individuals to relate to new information by identifying the 
classes of objects and events to their existing knowledge. 
This strategy further acts as a compass in charting a course 
for future actions. Thus selective information theory 
states that we select information that "supports our 
attitude and belief system, or supports a decision 
alternative to which we are leaning" (Bradac, Sandell, and 
Wenner, 1979, p. 36). New information is processed and 
selected according to the existing knowledge we have on the 
topic. Grenzke (1983) illustrates the application of the 
theory through an analogy. A legislator who is 
pro-education will focus on the taxation aspect of a 
business policy, and the importance of these revenues to 
schools. Grenzke explains that the "relationship between an 
individual's attitude toward an object or action and his/her 
subsequent behavior is relatively close" (p. 74). The 
dominant or the central attitude will be interconnected to a 
variety of other attitudes. As a result, individuals will 
seek information from sources that hold similar viewpoint as 
themselves. Applying the selective information theory in 
the political arena, Swanson (1976) explains that political 
communication will (a) activate partisan attitudes, (b) 
animate a selective information search that is consistent 
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with one's attitudes (c) validate those attitudes, and (d) 
produce a vote that is congruent with original partisan 
attitudes (p. 95). 
Another factor influencing acceptance of information 
states that individuals select information not only 
according to the existing knowledge possessed, but how the 
information is perceived also depends on the sender of the 
message. When we perceive the source as competent and 
trustworthy, information is accepted and attitudes change. 
Hass (1981) states that credibility produces attitude change 
through a "psychological process called internalization" (p. 
143). Internalization occurs because the receiver of the 
information adopts and integrates the same beliefs and 
values as that of the informant. Besides credibility, 
competence, character, power, and social attraction of the 
source induce attitude change (Hass, 1981; Lashbrook, 1975) 
Parallel to this body of literature is Bandura's (1983) 
Social Comparison theory which states that human beings 
indulge in self-evaluative and self-efficacy mechanisms in 
relation to others. Social referents motivate and influence 
our judgment. This approach enables individuals to set 
their goals and make decisions, because they are able to 
envision the results of their action in relation to others. 
Thus, how the information is perceived depends on the sender 
of the message. When we perceive the source as competent 
and trustworthy, information is accepted and attitudes 
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changed. However if the receiver perceives the source as 
unworthy, the information is then rejected. Lord and Putrevu 
(1993) state that source credibility "yields positive 
advantage" (p. 73). The message is not elaborated upon 
because the "credibility of the source is transferred to the 
message" (p. 73). Source credibility removes the perceived 
bias and the message does not receive extensive scrutiny. 
Message acceptance via the source credibility is, therefore, 
the peripheral route to message acceptance. 
In summary, one branch of literature states that human 
beings seek extensive information when the motivation is 
high. Search for exhaustive information results in rational 
processing of the information. The second factor states 
that we seek selective information so that we can simplify 
our complex environment and decisions. Besides being 
rational creatures, human beings are also emotional and 
social creatures. Depending on a credible source and 
comparing ourselves in relation to others facilitates 
decision making. Reliance on source credibility is the 
peripheral route to processing information. 
Role of Information in the Legislative environment: 
Researchers of Congress and state legislatures have 
offered differing viewpoints of the role of information in 
the enactment of a policy. Kingdon (1973) in his landmark 
study of the U.S. Congress, highlights the constraints the 
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lawmakers face. "Not every piece of information" or "every 
source of information" is useful to the lawmakers (p. 219). 
Bimber (1991), Denzau and Munger (1986), Kingdon (1973), and 
Shull (1987), state that information must meet three 
criteria to be useful: 
(i) information must be simple, 
(ii) it must be politically relevant, and 
(iii) information must be evaluative and not neutral. 
The sheer volume of information necessitates simplicity 
as there are too many issues vying for legislators' 
attention. Many issues also have technical content. 
Therefore, information must be packaged and simplified so 
that it can be comprehended quickly. Information that 
enhances career prospects or is rewarding for the lawmakers 
and their districts, is politically sensitive information. 
Kingdon (1973) asserts that based on the political 
consequences that the lawmakers may incur, information is 
accordingly used or modified. 
Policy information is "evaluative" (Kingdon, 1973; 
Sabatier & Whiteman, 1985), or "technical and substantive" 
information (Bimber 1991, p. 585). Policy information 
evaluates the contents looks at the causes of the problem, 
and the probable effect of the proposed legislation on the 
society. Kingdon (1973) states that opposed to neutral 
information, lawmakers need to be presented with "biased" 
information (p. 219). The biased or the evaluative nature 
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of information aids in identifying the flaws, the merits, or 
the necessity for the proposed legislation. The lawmaker 
can then dig information from the "opposite side and 
confront the two in a kind of adversary process" (p. 220). 
Neutral information involves the allocation of time (a 
scarce resource) and effort as the lawmakers have to screen 
the evidence themselves. Besides a legislator may not be 
able to distinguish whether the valuation he/she had done 
would be reflection of his/her political leanings. 
Sabatier & Whiteman (1985) further contend that sources 
of information differ depending on type of information. 
Committee hearings were useful for identifying the merits of 
proposed legislation, while interest groups were better at 
providing politically sensitive information (p. 397). 
Role of Informants in the Decision Making Environment: 
In the decision making environment, those who are in 
the position to supply the necessary information will exert 
greater influence. Many studies have identified the 
sources of voting cues (Kingdon, 1973; Mooney, 1991; 
Sabatier & Whiteman, 1985; Songer, 1988; Ray, 1982). Mooney 
(1991) classifies legislative sources of information into 
three categories. 
the middle rangers. 
These are the insiders, outsiders, and 
Insiders are the legislators• 
colleagues and staff members. They have the same pressures 
and experiences as legislators, and are in daily contact 
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with them. Outsiders are the mass media, constituents, and 
bureaucrats from other branches of the government. They do 
not have an on-going contact with the legislators. The 
middle range sources operate under different constraints and 
experiences. However, they understand the legislative 
process, and interact with the lawmakers regularly. These 
are the interest groups and the executive agencies. 
(I) The Insiders. 
(a) Colleagues & Committee Members: 
Literature on decision making and information sources 
show that legislators depend on their colleagues for voting 
cues (Kingdon, 1973; Mooney, 1991; Ray, 1982). The reason 
lawmakers turn to colleagues for advice and guidance is 
because they are of "equal status" (Kingdon, 1973, p. 70). 
Colleagues can be trusted for their judgment which is based 
on knowledge of facts, and their past performances. The 
specialist legislator who is a member of the committee is 
presumed to have knowledge that others do not possess about 
the policy. 
Zweir (1979) categorizes members as "specialists" and 
"non-specialists" (p. 32). Members who sat on committees and 
sub-committees when the bill was being initially considered 
were labeled specialists. The specialist legislator is 
presumed to have knowledge that others do not possess about 
policy matters. Researchers have found that specialists 
Legislative Decision Making 9 
relied more on staff as their source of information, and 
also sought more policy information (Ray, 1982; Songer, 
Underwood, Dillon, Jameson, & Kite, 1985; Zweir, 1979) 
Non-specialists relied more on external sources of 
information. These are the special interest groups and the 
constituents (Kingdon, 1973; Ray, 1982; Zweir, 1979). 
Bills are introduced and screened in the committees. 
During the spring session of the 89th General Assembly 2,509 
bills were introduced. Lawmakers acted upon 443 bills. 
This process assists in weeding out the unnecessary 
legislation. Ward (1993) thus calls the various committees 
"clearinghouses" (p. 217). It is also in the committees 
that the party agenda is set. 
Seeking information from colleagues results in 
communication networks being established. Communication 
networks and the formation of coalitions saves the 
legislators hours of legislative work in the form of reading 
and anxious deliberations (Feillin, 1966). A brief 
communication with colleagues facilitates "negotiations, 
compromises and developing legislative strategies" (p. 93) 
Committee members mobilize considerable influence through 
their formal positions and social networks. 
(b) Leadership: 
Ray's (1982) study of three state legislatures--the 
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and New Hampshire House of 
Representatives--has interesting significance. Ray (1982) 
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found that the pattern of decision making and their sources 
varied from one legislature to another legislature. Members 
of the Pennyslavnia House turned to their peers for 
information, while members of the Massachusetts House turned 
more to party leadership as an important cue source. The 
Massachusetts leadership exerted its powers through 
committee assignments which was accompanied by financial 
benefits. Party leaders exert their formal power by granting 
favors and sanctions for and against rank and file members. 
A test for political power for the leadership is the 
successful passage of key bills, and it also takes the form 
of symbolization (Shull & Vanderleeuw, 1987, Gioia, Thomas, 
Clark and Chittipedi, 1994). Of the total bills voted upon 
by members of the U. S. Congress, the rank and file members 
were called upon to vote in a certain manner by their 
leadership only on critical issues. Kingdon's (1973) 
results thus showed that leadership was ''singularly 
unimportant" in the Congressmen's overall voting decisions 
(p. 105). Leadership influenced the outcome of the 
legislation only on key or controversial issues, as the 
successful passage of these bills was indicative of party 
unity and a strong leadership. 
(II) Middle Range Sources: 
Lobbyists: 
Salisbury (1969) states that individuals join groups 
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and associations because they desire a "different set of 
social goals" (p.3). These goals may be material, solidary, 
or purposive benefits. Material benefits include jobs, 
increase in salary and so on. Solidary incentives are 
recognition of group's values and identity. Purposive 
incentives are suprapersonal goals such as state or civil 
liberty, good government and so on. Purposive benefits 
procured by the association/group are filtered to all levels 
of individuals, despite the fact these individuals did not 
expend any efforts to procure these benefits. Organizations 
or interest groups arrive on the political scene to "lobby 
for collective good" (p. 17). Zeigler & Baer (1969) thus 
define interest groups as "transmission belts between 
individual and the governmental institutions" (p. 3). 
The role of the interest groups in the legislative 
activity is categorized as: informant, administrative, and 
contact person. (Zeigler and Baer, 1969). Lobbyists supply 
political and policy information. Administrative duties 
include research and planning strategies. In the role of 
contact persons, lobbyists build communication bridges. 
In order to gain access and supply information to the 
legislators, lobbyists communicate through the constituency 
base, research, and campaign contributions. Zeigler & Baer 
(1969) suggest that "the efforts of the lobbyist are never 
the major reason for power," because "different groups 
receive their power from different sources" (p. 196). 
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Certain groups are powerful because of high membership, 
while others derive their power because of economical or 
ideological reasons. 
{III) The Outsiders: 
(a) Constituents: 
Enzle, Harvey, and Wright (1992) state the elected 
officials have an "implicit obligation" to their 
constituents (p. 238). They discharge their duties by 
establishing policies that are beneficial for the public 
good. One reason legislators are motivated to shape good 
policies is because their personal goal of being reelected 
are determined by the constituents. Constituents, therefore, 
play an important role in the legislators' decision making 
processes. Denzau and Munger (1986) elaborate that the 
relationship among constituents, lobbyists, and the 
legislators is based on the exchange theory. Special 
interests offer contributions to legislators; voters offer 
votes; and legislators seek both vote and contributions in 
exchange for the groups' and the constituents' preferred 
interests. 
(b) Media: 
The trends in public opinion are of ten vocalized 
through the media. Certain issues and policies will receive 
tremendous coverage. The power of the media as an agenda 
setter is well known. Governmental bodies respond by taking 
Legislative Decision Making 13 
action on the issue. Manheim (1987} states that the link 
among the media, the public, and the policy, is through the 
flow of information. This link is also quite complex. How 
individuals or institutions respond to the stimuli depends 
on their pattern of behavior. Media functions as an 
informant in the legislative environment. 
All of the above factors are classified into three 
broad variables by Ellickson (1992} and Meyer (1980}. These 
are institutional, environmental and personal attributes. 
Personal attributes include education, expertise, 
personality, political experience, and political philosophy. 
Constituents, media and interest groups are classified as 
environmental factors. Institutional characteristics 
include party, leadership and formal positions of the 
legislator in the office. 
The Role of Information and Voting Cues. 
Political science researchers have identified the two 
factors that play a decisive role in the legislature. These 
two factors are information and the sources of voting cues 
that provide information to the legislators. Paucity of 
time and the profusion of information available to the 
lawmakers makes their task extremely difficult and complex. 
Several investigations (Bimber, 1991; Jones, (1976}; Songer, 
1988} have examined the lack of influence that information 
has in the legislative arena. The reasoning is associated 
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with the comfort level the legislator has with the 
information. In general, a legislator will only use the 
information with which he/she has developed a comfortable 
level. Information that is congruent with and the 
lawmakers' existing knowledge and experiences will be 
considered and incorporated. This strategy eliminates the 
need for extensive research, and aids in decision making. 
Information cannot be divorced from the suppliers who 
provide the data. Research shows that committee members, 
leaders, constituents, staff, and lobbyists influence 
legislation. Source credibility is thus an important factor 
in the legislative arena (Kingdon, 1973; Songer, Underwood, 
Dillon, Jameson, and Kite, 1985; Ray, 1982; Ward, 1993). 
Having illustrated these facts, the basis for establishing 
the two criteria which are information and source valance 
has not been fully explained by researchers in the political 
arena. Enactment of laws will be better understood by 
providing a psychological perspective of the political 
behavior and the decision making process of the legislators. 
In attempting to link information and source valance with 
the decision making theories, the purpose of this paper is 
to go beyond the previous research. 
The enactment of public policy without the input of the 
lobbyist is unthinkable. The common assumption of lawmakers 
and the lobbyists is that they are hand-in-glove, linked to 
the other, in the legislative activity through bribes and 
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vacation jaunts. What then is the input and influence of 
the pressure groups in the legislative environment? Past 
researchers have analyzed the political environment from the 
perspective of any one political agent. Few studies have 
examined the legislative environment from the perspectives 
of the lawmakers and the lobbyists. In order to draw an 
accurate picture of the legislative activity, the current 
research has been analyzed from the perspectives of both the 
lawmaker and the lobbyist. 
This study therefore attempts to investigate the 
following: 
RQl. What is the role of the legislators and the 
various agents in the legislators' environmental 
and institutional arena? 
RQ2. How is information selected? 
RQ3. What method of information processing is most 
used by the Illinois lawmakers in their decision 
making process? 
RQ4. Politically relevant information or policy 
information: What type of information is utilized 
by the Illinois lawmakers in the enactment of 
laws? 
RQS. What is the level of influence that lobbyists 
yield in the legislative arena? 
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CHAPTER II. 
Method and Data Collection 
All laws that impact society are enacted only when the 
General Assembly is in session. The finale is the 
deliberations that take place in the whole chamber when the 
legislators' cast their votes. The particular environment 
in which legislators operate involve debates, conflicts, and 
publicity. Every word, action, and behavior is closely 
scrutinized by the public and the media. Lawmakers are in 
great demand when the General Assembly is in session. The 
setting thus influences their behavior and affects their 
legislative activities. The behavior, voting patterns, and 
the decision making process of the governmental authorities 
would therefore be best understood in their natural setting. 
Furthermore, legislators return to their districts when the 
General Assembly is not in session. In order to gain access 
to legislators and lobbyists who arrive at the Capitol from 
all over the state, under one roof, field study was the 
logical choice. 
The proceedings of the General Assembly were observed 
between May 12 to May 25, 1995. During the final weeks of 
the spring session, most of the bills were in their third 
reading in the House and the Senate. 
collected through a two-fold process. 
Data for analysis was 
Notes were taken of 
the floor debates, the committee hearings, and the 
activities and the interactions that were observed among 
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legislators and their colleagues, between legislators and 
lobbyists, and among fellow lobbyists. Blending into the 
environment as a member of the public, the activities and 
the behavior of the subjects were observed from the public 
gallery. The observational data was also supplemented by 
interviewing the subjects. My role in the study was thus of 
a third party observer and an interviewer. 
The primary source of data came from the survey 
administered by interviewing legislators and lobbyists. Ten 
legislators were interviewed during and after the conclusion 
of the General Assembly. Time factors, plus politics, 
issues, and lobbyists vying for the members attention; made 
it extremely difficult to interview members during the 
concluding days of the session. Two legislators were 
interviewed in their off ices after the General Assembly 
concluded its session. A mail-in survey was distributed to 
members' district after the adjournment of the General 
Assembly. Two legislators responded to the mail-in survey. 
Legislators and lobbyists were approached non-randomly for 
the interview/survey. This strategy facilitated in gaining 
access to the busy and often hard-to-get subjects, and the 
task of collecting data was made easier. 
Interviews with the lobbyists were conducted in the 
public gallery, or when they were waiting outside the House 
and Senate chambers. Lobbyists were sometimes interviewed 
individually or in groups. Depending upon the response, 
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length of the interview varied from 10 minutes to around 30 
minutes. Lobbyists who did not wish to be interviewed 
responded by writing on the survey. Of the 47 lobbyists 
approached, one lobbyist refused to be interviewed. Among 
the 46 lobbyists interviewed, five are liaison officers. 
Liaison officers categorize themselves as "protecting the 
interest of the government." They were from the Department 
of Revenue and from the Secretary of State's office. 
Lobbyists protect the interest of special groups. They 
ranged from business groups, to health industry, labor, and 
the Catholic Church among others. The legislative 
environment and the modus operandi of the lobbyists and the 
liaison officers are similar. Liaison officers and 
lobbyists both conduct research, provide information to the 
legislators, advocate or oppose to the enactment of bills by 
mobilizing support for their cause. Therefore for the 
purpose of this study, liaison officers are categorized with 
the lobbyists. 
The core of the interview schedule designed for the 
legislators concentrated on the decision making process. 
The sources of information and influence; the constraints 
and motivation; the demands and compromises that 
legislators' encounter and consider when deciding on their 
votes, were probed. The interview format designed for the 
lobbyists was aimed at understanding their role and 
influence, the strategies they employed, and their 
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perceptions of the factors that influence legislative 
decisions. The interview format followed a deductible 
approach (see Appendix A-C) . Respondents were requested to 
answer to the open ended questionnaire handed to them. 
Although the questions were structured, follow-up or in 
depth questions were asked. This enabled me to seek 
clarifications, get a feel of the system, and understand the 
legislative process from the viewpoint of the involved 
parties. Responses were noted and taped simultaneously. 
During the later stage, when the answers became repetitive, 
notes were taken. 
The 32 tape recordings of the lobbyists, and the 10 
tape recordings of the legislators were transcribed in their 
entirety to ensure accuracy, and to interpret their meanings 
and cues that may not have been apparent at the time of the 
interview. The data collected of the final 14 lobbyists was 
inferred from the notes. The responses were first tabulated 
by keeping a count on the number of times a source was 
mentioned, and their percentile was accordingly calculated. 
The data is further divided into specific categories based 
on the model adopted by Ellickson (1992) and Meyer (1980) . 
These are personal attributes, institutional 
characteristics, and environmental factors. The sources of 
information and sources of influence are reported from the 
perspectives of the legislators and the lobbyists. 
Furthermore, sources that direct legislators attention 
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towards an issue in the decision making process are reported 
in the section, "issue prioritized." On the other hand, 
sources towards which lobbyists direct their attention in 
order to influence the decision making of the legislators 
are reported in the section, "lobbying strategy." The 
quantitative base that emerges from the frequency table thus 
constructed enables the investigator to identify factors in 
order of importance. The data also allows a basis for 
comparison between legislators and lobbyists, and among the 
various categories (environmental, institutional, and 
personal attributes) and their sub-categories (experiences, 
expertise, reputation, committee members, leadership, party, 
constituents and interest groups among others) . 
Additionally, using quotes extensively throughout the 
paper captures the legislative climate and reveals the 
essence of the decision making process. Secondly, data that 
is not quantifiable is discerned by the inferences from 
these quotes. The word or phrase was analyzed by counting 
the number of times it appeared in the category or sub-
category of personal, institutional, and environmental 
factors. The theme was also a unit of analysis. Recurring 
similar assertions constituted to a theme. In the sub-
category of constituents, for example, legislators made the 
assertion about "my community/district" several times. 
Quotes reflecting the consitutency theme were thus analyzed. 
Thus, the qualitative descriptions add color and character 
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to the faceless respondents, thereby enabling a better 
understanding not only of the decision making process, but 
also of those who influence the legislative process. 
Finally, supplementing data from the interview notes 
and the observations from the gallery allowed for a 
portrayal of a more complete picture. Thus, field 
observations and notes corroborate the cumulative data 
documented from various sources. The use of triangulation, 
or the use of multiple data collection techniques is a 
typical method to investigate the reliability and validity 
of a data set. Anderson (1987) and O'Hair and Kreps (1990) 
state that "combination of analyses offers a greater 
empirical and conceptual accountability on the part of the 
researcher" as a fuller and an accurate understanding is 
derived (p. 52). In this study, subjective interpretations 
are marginalized, through the use of overlapping methods, 
thereby, enhancing the reliability and validity of the 
research. 
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CHAPTER III. 
FINDINGS. 
Lawmakers' primary function is the enactment of good 
public policies. It is thus logical that environmental 
factors, 65%, be of highest consideration by the Illinois 
legislators. Institutional characteristics are rated at 
22%, followed by personal attributes at 13% (see Table 1). 
Lobbyists are dependent on the lawmakers for the successful 
passage of the public policy. Institutional characteristics 
and personal attributes of the legislator are rated at 49 
and 32% each, followed by environmental characteristics 19% 
(Table 1) . 
Table 1. 
Factors that influence and inform legislators' and 
lobbyists' decision making. 
Participants 
Legislators 
Lobbyists 
Personal 
Attributes 
Il % 
13 13 
51 32 
Institutional 
Characteristics 
Il % 
23 22 
77 49 
Environmental 
Factors 
n % 
66 65 
30 19 
The sub-categories of each of the above factors are 
explained individually in the following sections. 
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Table 2 
Personal Attributes that influence and inform legislators' 
and lobbyists decision making 
Subcategory 
Legislators 
Previous Experience/ 
Beliefs 
Lobbyists 
Expertise 
Reputation 
Political Experience 
Political Philosophy 
Education 
A. PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES: 
Total 
Il % N % 
13 100 
13 13 
51 100 
14 27 
14 27 
8 16 
12 24 
3 6 
Decision making theories reveal that individuals when 
presented with competing choice rely on their attitudes, 
beliefs, and experiences. Information is also processed 
depending on the level of one's expertise and knowledge. 
Individuals are also affected and influenced by the 
credibility, education and social power that one exerts. 
Thus "certain personal attributes are advantageous for 
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obtaining legislative results'' (Ellickson, 1992, p. 286) 
Table 2 focuses on these factors that will be discussed in 
this section. 
Legislators simplify their task by appraising 
information based on their knowledge, beliefs and past 
experiences. The explanation being that limitations on time 
and cognitive constraints force the legislators to rely on 
simple rules of judgment. A representative said he made 
decisions: 
mostly by information received as interpreted through a 
core set of belief. On many issues, there is some 
personal experience, and that plays a role. 
During floor debates, the logic that members applied 
were: "according to my experience;" "as a former sheriff;" 
"my mom was a single mother, I know ... " and so on. 
Legislators make sense of events, policies, and their 
environment through interpretations that are based on their 
attitudes, belief systems, and reinforced by personal 
experiences. 
A particular issue that explains the role of personal 
experiences and beliefs is the legislation of the Chief 
Illini mascot. A Senator was being debriefed by her staff 
about the upcoming issues of the day. These issues were to 
be discussed in the Senate and in the various committees in 
which she was a member. One of the issues to be deliberated 
in a committee hearing was the issue of the Chief Illini 
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mascot. The senator mentioned to her staff that she did not 
wish to be involved in the discussion as the subject was an 
"emotional issue." She sought no further information as to 
the merits, flaws or the impact of this legislation. During 
the committee hearings, when the American-Indian students 
presented their arguments that the mascot portrayed their 
culture in a poor light, the senator was persuaded. She 
actively participated in the ensuing discussions, and voted 
with the stance adopted by the American-Indian students. 
She justified her actions by explaining that she too would 
be slighted, if the culture of the African-Americans was 
depicted in a detestable manner. The African-American 
senator simplified her decision of a complex ("too 
emotional") problem by relying on her past experiences, 
beliefs, and background. 
Another legislator justifies personal beliefs as a 
yardstick for his voting stance by declaring, "I feel that 
if I vote the way I really believe, it will be much easier 
to explain to people why I did what I did." 
Thus if the legislator was opposed to a cause, they 
argued that the bill was an "evil bill." If the legislator 
believed in the issue and was a proponent of the bill, then 
the bill was for the benefit of the society. The minority 
senator's reference to her background or a legislator's 
reference to his beliefs, explains that attitudes and 
beliefs are reinforced by past experiences, ideology, and 
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education. These factors, 13% (Table 1 and 2) become 
important variables in the influencing legislative behavior 
as legislators select information with which they are 
familiar. 
Understanding human nature, the 46 lobbyists rely 
heavily the personal attributes of the legislators for a 
successful passage of their piece of legislation. Lobbyists 
consider the overall personal attributes of the legislators, 
32% (Table 1) , as the second most important factor when they 
solicit a legislator to sponsor their bills. 
Expertise and reputation, 27% each (Table 2), are 
resources of influences, and are of equal significance to 
the lobbyists. Meyer (1980) explains that reputation and 
expertise gives "potential power to the reputed individual" 
(p. 565). Being "competent," "intelligent," "responsible," 
"articulate," "knowledgeable," and having the ability to 
"shepherd the bill we want, and bulldog the bill we don't 
want" are the qualities of expertise listed by the 
lobbyists. 
Lobbyists also consider how the lawmakers are 
"perceived by their contemporaries." A legislator's 
"reputation," "credibility," whether they have "no slander" 
are "likeable," and "well accepted" are the attributes 
associated with the legislators' reputation. One lobbyist 
explained in great detail that "I do not get a sponsor for a 
bill who has more enemies than friends." He considered 
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"whether they (legislators) were well accepted by 
colleagues, or whether they make themselves distrusted and 
alienated." 
Political experience, 16% (Table 2) is gained by 
seniority and formal positions occupied in office. 
Lobbyists woo governmental authorities based on 
"seniority", "tenure", and "clout" they exert. The newly 
elected legislators had a "learning curve" in the 
legislative process. They were labeled as "freshmen" by the 
lobbyists. According to them these freshperson legislators 
were "seeking direction," "harder to convince," and 
"apprehensive." A big difference between a senior 
legislator and a newly elected legislator was that one was a 
"realist," while the other was an "idealist." The following 
quote by a lobbyist demonstrates why seniority is considered 
a source of leverage: 
A seasoned legislator is really a professional, much 
easier to deal with. You walk away from him, you know 
what he is really going to do. An incumbent legislator 
doesn't know what his leadership is going to tell him. 
Political philosophy, 24% (Table 2), was identified as 
the interests towards the bill or issue that the "legislator 
care(d) about." The lobbyists' perceptions correlates with 
the legislators' criteria of personal beliefs. A particular 
rite, all lobbyists observed, was keeping a vigilance of 
roll-call data which tracks the voting pattern of 
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legislators on various issues. Lobbyists approached 
legislators to sponsor their bill, according to the realm in 
which the legislator was an activist, and a believer in an 
issue. Legislators were solicited, because they were "a 
supporter of the item," were "interested in my bill. A 
legislator who is interested in agriculture, you don't ask 
to sponsor a health bill." When lobbyists solicit 
legislators to sponsor their bill, the legislators' response 
usually varies depending on factors such as: the issue, 
politics, the interest groups, and other criteria. However, 
the overwhelming response the lobbyists receive is 
"generally favorable." This is because lobbyists approach 
legislators to sponsor their bill with similar ideological 
inclinations as themselves. Like the legislators, interest 
groups also turn to those sources for sponsorship of their 
bills with whom they have compatible ideology. Interest 
groups seek out legislators whose political philosophy is 
similar to their own. 
B. INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS. 
Organizational influence is diffused through the formal 
positions occupied in the hierarchical order, and by virtue 
of being associated to the institution. The structural 
aspects of the governing institution which is comprised of 
colleagues and committee members, leadership and party, and 
staff will be reported in this section. 
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Table 3 gives an overview of the institutional factors that 
influence and inform legislators' and lobbyists' decision 
making. 
Colleagues & Committee Members: 
Colleagues are viewed as influential in two aspects of 
decision making, source information 22%, and source of 
influence (35%) (Table 3). Previous studies show that the 
lawmakers' peers are a strong, influencing force (Feillin, 
1966; Kingdon, 1973; Mooney, 1991; Ray, 1982; Songer 1988). 
The data collected for this study shows consistent results. 
Legislators do not have knowledge on each and every issue. 
Different legislators have varying expertise. An opinion 
from a skilled legislator can be very important. A 
legislator explains: 
If I have knowledge about an area, I try to impart it 
to others who ask; if I don't, I try to ask questions 
to better understand my votes. 
Formation of coalitions and communications networks 
facilitates legislators in reaching a consensus. This 
factor can be understood by a legislator who remarked that 
"I have listened to colleagues and in return they respect my 
opinion on positions." Bimber (1991), Jones (1976) and 
Kingdon (1973) emphasize that members seek information from 
colleagues who have the same ideological and political 
positioning as their own. I observed that legislators voted 
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for colleagues who were not in their seats when the roll 
call was announced. Their votes reflected a similar 
pattern. Another aspect that was observed was the 
indecisive or the less informed legislator. During roll-
call, the hesitant legislator would have hands on the 
switch, eyes trained on the electronic board, but would not 
punch the "yes" or the "no" button immediately. They would 
observe the general trend of their colleagues or party on 
the issue, and their decisions were accordingly made. The 
data highlights the influence of colleagues through 
coalition formation. Coalition formation, however, need not 
be from the members from the same party. 
Lobbyists seek out legislators 50 percent of the time 
(committee members - 13%; and other legislators - 37%; Table 
3). They are a source of information regarding the status of 
the bill, have the power to channel debates, and set the 
party agenda. This factor is highlighted by the following 
quote by a labor lobbyist: 
Most of the legislation we have attempted to introduce 
this year has failed to get out of the Rules Committee, 
or failed in the assigned committee. If it goes to the 
committee, it fails to get called or when they do call 
it, the vote is seven to four. They have the seven and 
we have the four. When we go to the committee to 
testify against the negative legislation, it dies seven 
to four. 
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Bills and amendments are also drafted in the committees 
and sub-committees. Venting his frustration, another 
lobbyist complained that select members work out the 
amendments in the sub-committees. These amendments then 
become the key bill, while the bill that was introduced 
becomes the "shell bill." 
What they of ten do is strike out everything that is in 
the original bill, and put things in the amendments 
Last night, the amendment that came was 144 pages. The 
amendment is the bill. This time round the session 
wait and watch the amendment, because they are the 
cues. 
The "specialist'' legislator is thus sought by other 
members for trustworthy information and advice. Lobbyists 
seek these legislators as they have the power to influence 
and mobilize support or opposition for their cause, and 
influence legislation. 
Committee members have had many occasions to review the 
merits of the bills. Other members have been influenced by 
their colleagues through coalition formation, and lobbied 
heavily by interest groups. By the time the matter reaches 
the floor debate, members have reached a state of agreement 
or disagreement about a particular issue in majority of the 
cases. Kingdon (1973) calls this stage in the decision 
making a "pre-consensus(ual) process" (p.242). 
Lobbyists, thus, consider the floor debates as 
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"unimportant" 68% of the time. The deliberations on the 
floor that can take the shape of screaming, shouting, and 
thumping was categorized as "show," "theatrics," "silly," 
"dog and pony show," "in love with their own voice," 
"political positioning," "chance to express their opinion 
for the media and their constituents" and "partisan." 
Lobbyists thus remarked that they watched the floor 
proceedings for "fun." It was the "committee hearings and 
the staff members" that the lobbyists "watched" to ascertain 
the status or the fate of their bill. However, 28% of the 
lobbyists considered the floor proceedings as "critical to 
the process," "democratic," and "fair, although it may not 
seem to be so." The functional value of the floor debates, 
on the other hand, for the lawmakers is indeed meaningful. 
Besides filtering out bad legislation, the floor debate was 
a decisive venue that swayed the direction of their votes, 
asserted the legislators. 
Leadership 
Legislators, in this study, do not consider party 
leadership as a major source of influence in their voting 
decisions. Only two legislators mentioned leadership as a 
source of influence (13%, Table 3). One legislator 
confirmed that leadership and committees set the party 
agenda and prioritize issues. Interest groups also consider 
leadership together with political party, 14% of the time 
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in their calculations (Table 3). Lobbyists appraise whether 
the "the member is in hot water with their leadership," "the 
favorability of the leadership," or "member of party caucus 
is important to me." A lobbyist explained that: 
a lot of time we go to the leaders, and ask whom would 
you like to sponsor, sometimes they say it doesn't 
matter. Sometime they say give to this person. It 
will be good to their district. 
Legislators responded that there was no organizational 
or environmental pressure when they made their decisions. 
They voted under "no constraints" 100% of the time. During 
the spring session, 99% of the time they had not "purposely" 
changed their position from support to opposition and vice 
versa on any issue. One legislator acknowledged that in 
light of new information presented, one may have to "change 
their viewpoint, but that's very seldom." However, a quote 
from a lobbyist rejects the above data. A lobbyist was 
relating some of the typical responses of the legislators: 
Yes, I am with you. I like the legislation, but I have 
to vote against you. I think this is a terrible piece 
of legislation, but I am going to vote for it. Well, 
whatever the speaker says, or whatever the leader says 
or whatever the president says. I am going to do 
whatever I am going to do. 
Despite their emphatic denial, the above quote 
highlights that legislators do have constraints under which 
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they operate. Legislators do not wish to acknowledge that 
they may have succumbed to leadership or to environmental 
demands. A plausible explanation could be that their 
contrary actions would mean a loss of reputation, and that 
they were puppets in the hands of their leaders and pressure 
groups. 
Leadership sets the party agenda. Party leadership and 
strength is determined by the successful passage of 
controversial issues. Lawmakers require detailed 
information and are ''hard to get" when the issue is a matter 
of prestige for the party. An intern explained that 
"leaders do not want to be embarrassed bringing up an 
important issue and not winning." The strategy adopted by 
leaders on controversial issues is to bring the bill on the 
floor, only when the necessary support has been garnered for 
the successful passage of the bill. The episode that 
illuminates this factor is the issue of the workmen 
compensation bill. 
The sponsors of the workmen compensation bill were the 
business, insurance, and the medical groups. The labor 
group was opposing the legislation. A circulating piece of 
information heard from a lobbyist, who had drafted the 
workmen compensation bill, was that the bill was "two votes 
short.'' The bill was shelved until the last day of the 
session. When it was finally called for floor debate, it 
failed to muster enough votes. This factor illuminates how 
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leaders set the party agenda, though they may not be 
successful all the time. 
The influence of leadership was intensely visible in 
the 89th General Assembly. Republicans for the first time 
in a decade were controlling the House and the Senate. They 
had an ally in the Governor who was also a Republican. 
Taking advantage of the structural changes, the Speaker 
wanted to implement his fast-track agenda. One of the goals 
was to end the session on schedule. Being able to conclude 
the session as per plan, thus took on the symbolism of 
Republican strength and leadership. In their new-found 
defensive role, the Democratic agenda was to embarrass the 
Republican leadership. The main Democratic ploy was to 
stall the floor proceedings as long as possible, so that the 
Assembly would not adjourn as publicized. Thus, partisan 
politics was unusually high in the 89th General Assembly. 
All the lobbyists interviewed complained about the 
heightened partisan activities indulged by both parties. A 
lobbyist who was returning to the arena after seven years 
found that politics had become more refined: 
It's more difficult game they play these days. It's 
not antagonistic, its more of a gentleman-ladies type 
of game. It probably has more finesse. 
The art of playing politics had been cultivated and 
cultured. Though some lobbyists expressed that good 
partisan politics served a function, other lobbyists 
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maintained that politics was more like "Harvard playing 
Yale". Internal dynamics, partisan composition, and 
structural changes resulted in partisan cohesion being high 
on both sides. Acknowledging that members may vote 
differently despite leadership pressure, a legislator 
remarked that "I owe it to them (the leaders) to explain why 
I'm doing what I'm doing. But the times that happened last 
session were no problem." Members may not have felt the 
leadership pressure, because of high party allegiance by the 
members. 
Staff: 
Staff is rated at 30% as a source of information, 
however they are not a source of influence in the Illinois 
legislators' voting decisions (Table 3). Staff is an 
important entity to the interest groups. A strategy that 
lobbyists employ in order to ensure legislators' attention 
is cultivating and maintaining relationships with the staff. 
Conveying clear, concise and truthful information to the 
staff especially during crunch time, served the lobbyists' 
purpose of ensuring attention of a legislator (13%, Table 
3). Staff functions as a very important cue (23%) to the 
lobbyists in informing them about the status of the their 
bill. Lobbyists gain access to the legislators through 
their bill. Staff serves as a reservoir of information. 
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Table 4 
Environmental factors that influence and inform legislators' and lobbyists' decision 
making. 
Constituents Media Mail 
Subcategory n % n % n % 
Legislators 
Source of 11 17 
influence 
Source of 13 20 10 15 6 9 
information 
Issue 14 21 2 3 4 6 
prioritized 
Lobbyists 
Source of 16 54 
influence 
Source of 1 3 
information 
Lobbying 4 13 1 3 9 30 
strategy 
Note. Dashes indicate that the data was not reported. 
Interest 
Groups 
n % 
6 9 
Total 
N 
66 
30 
% 
100 
100 
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c. ENYIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES: 
Legislators are influenced and constrained by their 
environment. The legislators' district influences and 
40 
motivates legislative behavior (Ellickson, 1992; Meyer, 
1980). The interest groups add pressure and influence 
(Langbein & Lotwis, 1990; Smith, 1984), and the media 
influences its power through agenda setting (Manheir, 1987). 
Constituents and mail, media and interest groups will be 
discussed in this section. Table 4 illuminates the data of 
each of these factors. 
Constituents: 
In their representative role, legislators are bound to 
their districts. Information is viewed from the telescopic 
lens of their constituents is exemplified by the data in 
Table 4. A Legislator's constituency is the most valuable 
source of information and influence. Many legislators 
declared, "I respond to the wishes of my 
district/community," "I believe in giving services back to 
my community," "My influence is my district." On occasions 
when personal beliefs clashed with the legislator's 
attitude, a legislator expressed that "I do not let personal 
interests be involved. I may have personal concerns on an 
issue, but, when I hit that button, I am taking into account 
what my district wants me to do, not what I want to do." 
The ideology of the legislators is of ten shaped by the 
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make-up of the legislator's district. A Chicago legislator 
from the "lake-front area," who had a large population of 
gays, was liberal. An Hispanic senator's concern was 
providing bilingual education and elimination of poverty 
from his district, and the concerns of the legislators from 
southern Illinois was the high level of unemployment in 
their districts. Depending on the needs of their districts, 
varying issues have different degrees of importance to the 
legislators. This factor is confirmed by the fact that 
21% of the time, issues are prioritized depending upon the 
cues received by the legislators' constituents. 
Electoral competition also plays its role in the 
resolution of an issue. Those members who have been 
reelected a number of times are more secure in their 
politics. The margin of votes by which a legislator is 
elected, is also appraised. A lobbyist explained that 
legislators who win by a large majority are usually more 
"responsive" than the legislators who have "squeak(ed) by." 
Legislators having won by a narrow margin of votes are, 
therefore,"nervous about anything they say or do." Another 
lobbyist highlighted a legislator who was elected by a 
margin of 80% votes from a competitive district is more 
confident, than a legislator elected from a non-competitive 
district. 
Lobbyists understand that the elected officials have 
loyalty to their electors. Constituency, 67% (Table 4)is 
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the sole instrument that lobbyists wield to mobilize 
influence in the category of environmental factors. They 
use strategies for the passage of a particular piece of 
legislation as "popular," "unfavorable" or that there was 
"no organized opposition" in the legislator's district. 
Without the constituency support, it is difficult for the 
lobbyists to garner support for their cause. 
Mail 
A tool that propels constituency influence is in the form of 
mail, fax and telephone calls to the representative. Issues 
are brought to members' attention by mail and telephone 
calls. Through this form of communication, legislators 
gauge the direction of constituents' thinking. During 
session time and depending on the issue, communication from 
the constituents is in greater volume. Telephone calls may 
range from 300 calls to 500 telephone calls, approximately 
500 to 1000 pieces of mail, and 20-30 faxes a week. 
Controversial issues generate intense and greater volume of 
mail and telephone calls. 
Lobbyists consider direct communication as an effective 
technique. Many lobbyists were in the business ranging from 
10 to 35 years. Therefore, they considered the "first call" 
or the "first mail" as effective. A lobbyist from the 
Illinois Bar Association said, "we have a lot of credibility 
behind us," while another explained that flooding the 
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representatives with mail could "sometimes be 
counterproductive." Instead of 1000 faxes to one 
legislator, the lobbyist explained that it would be far 
"more important, if the priest, lawyer, or the teacher at 
the local level" were to send the mail. A secretary 
described mail sent by lobbyists as "junk mail." Her quote 
explains that mail generated by special interest groups do 
not have as much authenticity as the mail sent by a member 
of the representative's district. 
However when grassroots mobilization is involved, 
lobbyists operate under different set of circumstances. The 
32,000 members of the Illinois Retired Teachers Association 
inundated members with telephone calls, mail, and personal 
appearances. AFL-CIO has a membership of 300,000. They 
mailed 85,000 pieces of mail and called 34,000 people who 
received that mail to make telephone calls to their 
legislators in opposition of the workmen compensation bill. 
The 6600 management employees of United Airlines were asked 
to call their representatives in support of a strong O'Hare 
airport. Advertisements in the newspapers, and commercials 
on radio and television were broadcast. The lobbyist of 
United Air said, "we know they are effective, because the 
legislators told us about it." Fifteen percent of the time, 
mail is a source of information and also serves as a device 
in directing legislators' attention (Table 4). 
The goal of all the legislators, in the survey, is to 
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serve the people by being the ''best representative" and to 
be ''re-elected." Constituents together with mail are a 
vital force in the decision making calculus of both the 
legislators and the lobbyists. 
Media. 
The power of the media and its role as an agenda setter 
is understood by the valance attached by the legislators. 
Media is rated at 18% by representatives. A surprising 
factor is that media is acknowledged as a source of 
information, and issues are also prioritized based upon the 
cues received by the media. However, media is not 
considered as a source of influence. This is surprising 
because during floor discussions, quotes and articles such 
The Chicago Tribune, The Sun Times, and other media were 
often cited as their basis for discussions. A major pre-
occupation of the legislators was reading various newspapers 
and their editorials. A feasible explanation is that media 
serves as a channel in directing the legislators' attention 
to salient issues. Media influences legislators indirectly 
through public opinion and editorials. 
According to the lobbyists, the floor debates are also 
shaped for the benefit of the media and the lawmakers' 
constituents. Media enhances or diminishes the legislators' 
image and role. Legislators' use media to promote their 
causes and image. 
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The biggest contrast between the role of the public 
officials and the lobbyists is depicted by the valance 
attached to the media. Legislators rate the media highly, 
while media is not a factor considered by the lobbyists. 
The only lobbyist who mentions media as a cue for tracking 
their bills, is the labor lobbyist, who has a high rate of 
membership. This factor highlights that the trend of public 
opinion is closely monitored by interest groups with large 
membership, while the majority of the lobbyists work closely 
for their clients interests. 
Interest Groups: 
The most striking aspect of the finding is the ranking 
of the interest groups. Lobbyists are rated only 9% as the 
source of information (see Table 4). As a source of 
influence, interest groups have no ranking in the 
legislators' cognitive map. However, an indirect reference 
by a legislator suggests the influence that lobbyists 
exercise. "Unfortunately, politics have gotten away from 
the interest of the people to that of special interests." 
The legislator further explained that he did not succumb to 
pressure group tactics because he made "intelligent 
decisions" on behalf of his constituents, and that "they 
kept voting me back in." Another quote from a lobbyist from 
the Bar Association highlights the power of special interest 
groups. 
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It's gotten too far off hand, because it appears that 
special interests now make all the decisions, and 
legislators are so beholden to them that they fall 
right into their plan. Lobbying is not a profession, 
but its gotten to a point where legislators are taking 
them seriously. 
As legislators ultimate goal is reelection, groups that 
have clout to sway the electorate will influence legislative 
decision making. Explaining the typical response of a 
legislator when approached, a lobbyist related: 
They want to know who is opposed to this. If I tell 
them Chamber of Commerce is opposed to it, Farm Bureau 
is opposed, AFL-CIO is opposed to it. They probably 
would not do anything to work on that project. They 
want to gauge what their decisions would testify. 
Another lobbyist remarked: 
A lobbyist's job is to explain to the legislator that 
the group that the lobbyist is representing is really 
the influential group. They will influence the 
election. Because that's the language the legislators 
understand. Legislators understand votes and how to 
get votes." 
Legislative decisions are often determined by the group 
that is in support or in opposition of a particular bill. 
Ideological positioning also determines that certain groups 
will be favored with one party over other groups. The 
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Democratic party has traditionally been associated with 
"have nots." During the current session the labor group 
maintained that their role had primarily been "defensive." 
Instead of being one of the top three interest groups in 
Illinois, the labor group occupied the number six position. 
As Medicaid reform was a Republican agenda, many lobbyists 
interviewed were from the health industry. All lobbyists, 
however, insisted that they worked with members from "both 
side of the aisle." A lobbyist explained that they "were 
loyal to no one," because of electoral uncertainty and 
outcome. 
A majority of the lobbying activities are, however, 
concentrated toward whichever party is in power. It was 
observed that members of the majority party were paged and 
wooed more than members of the minority party. This was 
evident from the fact that there were more bouquets on the 
Republican side of the aisle. When the House is in session, 
members can be paged by sending visiting cards in the 
chamber. Republican members received more requests from 
lobbyists wanting to meet them. 
Lobbyists view themselves as informants, 
administrators, and contact persons (see Table 5). A 
lobbyist said they considered themselves as agents 
"promoting and processing progressive legislation" by either 
being proactive, or maintaining status-quo. 
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Table 5 
Role of the Lobbyists. 
Category Il percentage 
Informants 28 61 
Informative 
Educator 
Technical Advisor 
Experts 
Administrative 12 26 
Researcher 
Resource 
Proactive 
Contact Person 6 13 
Facilitator 
Negotiator 
Political Agent 
The data is consistent with Zeigler and Baer's(1969) 
categorization of the lobbyists. In the role of informants, 
61%, Table 5, the lobbyists see themselves as experts on the 
issue. Lobbyists explained that the plethora of information 
vying for the legislators' attention and the technical 
nature of many issues, made it extremely difficult for 
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legislators to be knowledgeable on all the policy matters. 
A factor that is not often associated with lobbyists, but 
was insisted by almost every lobbyist interviewed was the 
"credibility" of the information, and having a "truthful" 
relationship with legislators and staff. Ability to provide 
information that was accurate, concise, and at short notice, 
especially during "crunch time" served as an instrument of 
persuasion. Information that was not credible could 
embarrass the legislator. Legislators will never trust a 
lobbyist who jeopardizes their career goals. Explaining the 
valuable role that lobbyists play as informants, a lobbyist 
articulated that a "good legislator will try to find out the 
leading proponent of the legislature, and the best opponent. 
The lawmaker then has a real good criteria in order to 
determine the best legislation." The quote reiterates 
Kingdon's (1973) observation that legislators need 
evaluative information for decision making. Besides 
channeling communication to the decision makers, special 
interests groups provide a system of check and balances. 
They help check demands made by others, and help to compose 
alternative policies in their role as educators and experts. 
The administrative role, 26%, involves research, 
preparing testimony, speeches, and writing letters. A 
lobbyist explained that lobbying is "an extremely demanding 
occupation. I educate, I strategies, I prepare testimony, I 
give testimony." 
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Lobbyists use research 87% of the time to persuade, 
protect, and promote their interests. Tracking bills and 
amendments through research serves as an important cue in 
alerting the lobbyists about the status of their bills. 
The sources of information for the lobbyists are: 
Legislative Information Services, various agencies, 
legislation in other states and Congress, staff, bills, and 
the members themselves. Lobbyists spend a lot of time 
discharging their administrative duties. Contrary to 
popular belief, much of the legislation is enacted because 
the lobbyists are able to provide credible information. In 
contrast, personal investigation, bills and reports and 
reading as a source of information is rated only 13% by the 
legislators. 
It was in the role of the contact person, 13% (Table 5) 
that the behavior, the rites and the ceremonies of the 
lobbying profession was most observed. In trying to build 
contacts, lobbyists linger in the corridors, the public 
galleries, and outside the chambers, waiting to the get the 
attention of legislators. The key word among lobbyist is 
"watch." Armed with cellular phones and pagers, lobbyist 
scrutinize the legislative calendar and alert their clients 
about various bills. Describing their job as a "marathon," 
lobbyists maintained that to gauge, protect, and promote 
legislation their task involved full-time, personal presence 
at the Capitol. Lobbyists "watched" the committee hearings, 
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the floor debates, the bills, the staff, the amendments, 
the legislators, and other lobbyists. 
Direct communication in the form of personal contact is 
the most effective technique. Indirect communication takes 
the form of entertainment through luncheons, vacation 
jaunts, and campaign contributions, generating mail, and 
conducting town hall meetings. "High level of personal 
contact" according to the lobbyists served as a means to 
gain access and facilitate communication. Building contacts 
could prove slightly more difficult for women lobbyists. 
Female lobbyists said that they were treated equally with 
male lobbyists. However, two female lobbyists acknowledged 
that many female lobbyists had taken to playing golf, and it 
was difficult to be a member of the "old boys club." A 
female lobbyist responded that: 
Its very awkward to be a good old boy, and go out to 
the golf course, show up at the tavern and whatever. 
And just be the old buddy ... It's not a disadvantage, 
but I don't have that edge. 
Gender differences highlight that many of the personal 
relationships are built outside the legislature. Campaign 
contributions do play a role in amassing influence. A 
statement by the president of AFL-CIO reveals the importance 
of campaign contributions. The governor was complaining 
that the labor group made no contribution to the Republican 
candidates: 
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I said, many times we do. When Jim Thompson was 
governor, we have endorsed candidates. Sometimes we 
don't endorse candidates because we know it's a 
Republican seat, at other times the candidate lost in 
the primaries ... I had a long discussion with Governor 
Edgar, two months ago. 
Campaign contributions are also a factor that 
influences legislative judgment. Table 6 reveals that 37% 
of the lobbyists directly endorsed and funded candidates, 
46% lobbyists supported candidates through Political Action 
Committees (PAC). The data reveals that the majority of the 
lobbyists believe in maneuvering support through these 
channels. 
Table 6 
Lobbyists' campaign contribution to candidates. 
Campaign contribution 
Endorses candidates 
Does Not Endorse 
Political Action Committee 
No Answer 
17 
6 
21 
2 
percentage 
37 
13 
46 
4 
However without other resources, such as: the 
constituency base; the ideology or the merits of the bill; 
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the credibility of information; and building of truthful 
relationship; the lobbyists' persuasive skills do not have 
much significance. The common assumption of lobbyists as 
powerful and influential, and legislators as mere puppets 
swayed by campaign contributions is, therefore, not entirely 
true. Lobbyists rank much lower than all the other sources, 
and is also not considered an influential lever by the 
lawmakers (Table 4). 
Lobbyists do have certain rules and protocol that they 
adhere to. A lobbyist explained that they had a "strict 
code of ethics," and all his activities were in accordance 
with the law. They could not by-pass federal regulations. 
Providing "credible" information was the number one rule of 
survival. Other subtle rules that they observed were never 
to page a legislator whose bill was scheduled for floor 
debates, and never to eavesdrop on a conversation between 
another lobbyist and the legislator. Another rule was that 
legislators were never tapped on the shoulder, or addressed 
by their first name in public. They were always addressed 
as "representative" or "senator." 
An occupational hazard that lobbyists faced was that 
legislators never made commitments. A lobbyist who was also 
an ex-legislator remarked, "One thing you learn early as a 
legislator that you do not make a firm commitment. Most of 
them, unless they are fairly new, never make a firm 
commitment. Because they never know what's going to happen 
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unless they know." The main activity of the lobbyists was 
therefore to "watch" and be alert to proceedings, understand 
words and body language, track the bills and amendments, be 
sensitive to unspoken messages and have a finger on the 
pulse of the circulating gossip and stories. Various 
lobbyists mentioned that there was a "lot of floating 
information," "information here was a bombshell," 
"communication is the world we live in," and "you would be 
amazed at the grapevine." 
Communication, resources, and information vary 
depending on the range of the issue. They can take many 
forms depending on the lobbyists agenda. The strategies 
varied if the objective was to "pass" or "kill" legislation. 
Certain issues required grassroots mobilization, while other 
issues required gaining influence through different avenues 
discussed earlier. 
It is extremely interesting that the legislators' 
perception of the lobbyists is only informational, (9%, 
Table 4). On the other hand, lobbyists also see themselves 
as a strong force, influencing legislative decision making. 
Eighty-eight percent of the interviewed lobbyists believe 
that their presence has a great impact in the legislative 
process. However, four percent state depending on the issue, 
and another four percent state depending on the party in 
power, the lobbyists presence is an impetus in persuading 
the lawmakers. Two liaison officers (four percent), 
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however, state that they are "probably not" a source of 
influence in swaying the government authorities. A 
probable explanation could be because they are from the 
Department of Revenue, they do not have much input in the 
budget policies which are framed largely by the Governors' 
office. 
There is a certain invisible hierarchical structure 
among lobbyists. Their modus operandi thus depends on the 
nature of the issue and the clients they handle. Among the 
contract lobbyists, the ex-legislator turned lobbyist was 
deemed more powerful than other hired guns. Special 
interest groups having citizens as active participants such 
as the Illinois Retired Teachers Association, the Coalition 
of Citizens with Disabilities in Illinois (CCDI), and other 
such groups operated through grassroots mobilization and 
personal appearances in large numbers. The lobbyist having 
executive agencies as their clients operated as the sole 
instrument in influencing the government authorities. 
The public image of the interests groups is negative. 
Lobbyists as "stodgy built with pocketful of cash," "one rug 
below the car salesmen and lawyers," "having $300 
luncheons," and "spending a lot in reelection" are myths, 
stressed the lobbyists. Lobbying was a constitutionally 
protected right. The First Amendment states that citizens 
have the right to petition their grievances to the 
government. Lobbyists asserted that they were the "voice of 
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the people ... representing a common interest." Lobbyists 
insisted that "like them," the general public should vote, 
talk and write to their elected officials in order to 
influence the legislation. Lobbyists emphasized that it was 
because "citizens get locked out of the process," the pubic 
did not like the governmental authorities and the the 
interest groups. 
Thus it is seen that lobbyists bring conflict to the 
environment. Conflict is created because for every 
proponent of an issue, there is an opponent. As the general 
conception of conflict is bad, legislators and the lobbyists 
receive negative publicity. Lobbyists have an important role 
that helps determine, evaluate and influence the merits or 
the flaws of an issue. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
CONCLUSION: 
In chapter one, a number of research questions were 
outlined which examined the interlocking issues associated 
with legislative decision making. Chapter three included a 
description of the sources of legislative influence as 
discovered by the author. In this chapter, the merger 
between the two are explored in an effort to develop a more 
complete picture of how legislatures enact legislation. To 
begin this exploration we will first review the research 
question as asked earlier, then outline some conclusions 
from this analysis, and finally, discuss some limitations to 
this research. 
Based upon the data discussed in chapter three, we now 
focus on research question one, which looks at the role of 
various actors to legislators. Lawmakers' utilize 
colleagues, leadership, and lobbyists in descending order of 
importance in their decision making processes. Peer 
influence has significant impact in the legislative 
decisions. Lawmakers turn to their colleagues who are 
knowledgeable to verify the authenticity of information. 
Social networks and coalitions, therefore, become important 
communication channels through which lawmakers develop 
strategies. Leadership is not a source of information, 
however it influences the outcome of the legislation through 
its power base. Lobbyists rank lowest in order of 
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importance. However they gain access to the legislators 
through the constituency base (67%, Table 4), and by 
exploiting the personal factors (32%, Table 2) of the 
legislators. 
Research question two, enquires how lawmakers select 
information. The data reveals that personal attributes 
though acknowledged only at 13% (Table 2) by the legislators 
play an important role in influencing legislation. 
Legislators select information that will support their 
attitudes and beliefs. They turn to colleagues who validate 
those ideologies. Thus personal attributes together with 
peer and leadership influence highlight that though 
constituents are the guiding force in terms of priotizing 
issues(21%), as source of information (20%), and as source 
of influence (17%) (Table 4), members rely most on insider 
sources of information. Lawmakers seek selective 
information that is congruent with their experiences and 
belief systems. This comfort level "reduces complexities" 
in their environment (Petelle & Maybee, 1974, p. 95), and 
facilitates in simplifying their judgments. 
These factors further illuminate that source valance is 
relatively high in the legislative environment. The problem 
posed by research question three as to what method of 
information processing is used by the Illinois lawmakers is 
thus answered. Committee members because of their 
competence, leadership because of their power base (Table 
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3), and media because of its credibility (Table 4), are held 
in high esteem. As representatives of the people, lawmakers 
live in a fish bowl and are dependant upon public opinion 
for the realization of their personal goals. They endeavor 
to seek credible information by transferring the credibility 
of the source to the credibility of the message (Lord & 
Putrevu, 1993). The data determines that legislators 
process information via the peripheral route. Information is 
not elaborated upon or extensively sought. Table 2 depicts 
that lawmakers bank on personal and party ideologies and 
their experiences. Tables 3 and 4 reflect that lawmakers 
rely on the influential providers of information. 
Legislators thus indulge in "satisficing strategies'' 
(Mooney, 1991, p. 446). 
Research question four enquires whether politically 
relevant information or policy information is utilized by 
the lawmakers in the enactment of laws. This question can 
be explained by focusing on the importance of information in 
the legislative environment. If information is power, it is 
surprising that interest groups and analysts are not 
acknowledged as sources of influence. Additionally, only 
one legislator acknowledged that one may change their 
position on a particular issue in view of new information 
received, while 99% of the legislators vote according to the 
original stance they had adopted. Thus, we find that 
information in the political environment is ''useful in only 
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supporting decisions, rather than arriving at decisions" 
(Bimber, 1991, p.). This factor is further substantiated by 
the fact that media (18%, Table 4) is ranked higher than 
bills and reports, personal investigation, and reading which 
are the basis of policy information. Leadership (13%, Table 
3), and interest groups (9%, Table 4) are also ranked lower 
than the media. This is a surprising factor because media 
focuses on a general and a broader range of issues. Media 
would not have the in-depth knowledge that leaders or 
lobbyists will possess about the bill. The data implies 
that lawmakers closely monitor the trend of public opinion. 
The importance to media confirms that lawmakers are 
conscious of the image they wish to project to the masses. 
The importance to seniority, committees, leadership, 
constituency, and media reveal that legislators are seekers 
of politically relevant information. These sources have the 
power to influence the goals of the elected official. 
According to the ELM model, when motivation, 
opportunity and ability are high; individuals will seek 
extensive information. In contrast to the legislators, 
lobbyists have a personal stake in the outcome of a policy. 
They seek extensive policy information through research and 
analysis of various bills. Lawmakers, on the other hand, 
seek extensive information when issues are controversial in 
nature. These issues generate more scrutiny from the 
leaders, media, and the constituents. The successful 
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passage of controversial issues reflects party and 
leadership strength. Lawmakers are therefore motivated to 
seek policy information on controversial issues. Committee 
members elaborate upon the information, because of their 
high level of involvement in framing a policy. 
The level of influence that lobbyist wield in the 
legislative arena is examined by research question five. 
Contrary to common assumption, lobbyists rank lowest in the 
order of importance among all the information providers in 
the legislative arena. This implies that the power of the 
lobbyist may not be as large as is generally conceived. 
Lobbyists bring conflict to the environment, and enable the 
lawmakers to evaluate and shape public policy. Lobbyists 
provide both policy and political information. Lobbyists 
perceive themselves overwhelmingly as informational and 
influencing levers. Lawmakers view them only as an 
informational source. This perception has not been altered 
since Zeigler & Baer's study of 1969. However, certain 
interest groups are influential and powerful. Party 
ideology also determines the favorability of some groups 
over others. Langbein & Lotwis (1990) state that the 
"influence of the lobbyists is both greater and both 
limited" (p. 59). Without other bases of support, the 
influence of the lobbyists can be limited. However working 
through the leverage of constituency and leadership, and 
campaign contributions, the lobbyists' power can be 
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extensive. 
Lobbyists have their own rites and culture that are 
adapted to survive in the legislative environment. The 
emphasis on constituents, committee members, personal 
attributes, and the close matching of the various criteria 
with the legislators, explain the understanding the special 
interest groups have of the proceedings. However 
differences in their opinion about the floor debate, media, 
leadership, and viewing themselves as an influencing force 
highlight the differences between the influencing lever and 
the decision maker. 
A common assumption that the concerns of the general 
public are not heeded in the murky game of politics, is not 
entirely true. Constituents set the political agenda. They 
are the most powerful force that motivates and molds 
legislative agenda, because the constituents determine the 
legislators' political future. Staff though rated at 30% 
as a source of information, like the lobbyists are not 
acknowledged as a source of influence. Kingdon (1973) 
explains the information that the staff /analysts provides is 
under the direction of their bosses. The services of the 
staff are therefore taken for granted. Staff is rated 
slightly higher by lobbyists. Staff functions as a conduit 
for information flow. 
All the above factors highlight that there are many 
sub-processes in legislative decision making. To ignore a 
Legislative Decision Making 63 
source or a cue and highlight a particular factor, would be 
like taking out a vital bolt from the legislative machinery. 
Also, it is too simplistic to assume that non-committee 
members do not have all the necessary knowledge, and do not 
make policy decisions. Information flow, in the legislature, 
is multi-directional. The institutional factors such as: 
various committee hearings, bills being read on three 
occasions, the approval of the bill from both Houses, 
together with all the various agents involved in informing 
the legislators' decision making process, assist the 
lawmakers in examining the authenticity of information. The 
manner in which legislators function thus depends on 
individual legislators' personal values, their goals and 
motivation, and their affiliations with the party and the 
governmental institution. 
Thus the present decision making theories have a very 
narrow focus. Source credibility theory is based on the 
receiver's perception. Acting on information based on one's 
attitude and beliefs does not explain whether the decision 
was rationally processed or the decision was based on one's 
biases. The ELM theory though has a broader range. 
However, it does not explain the phenomena that one could 
seek elaborate information, yet one would make decisions 
based on the peripheral route. Human beings act within the 
parameters set by personal, institutional and environmental 
factors. Decisions are made depending on the personal 
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attributes of the individual, the institution to which we 
are affiliated, and the societal norms where we live. 
Decision making is, therefore, a complex activity. A theory 
that addresses all the above factors may probably shed more 
light on this perplexing activity. 
Much of the above results are consistent with previous 
research. However, past studies have identified the source 
of information, and presumed that the source of information 
also influences the final decisions. However, the actors 
acknowledged as informational cues are not decreed as 
influential cues in this study. Future research should be 
conducted to find out the link between influence and 
information. 
Coalition building and social networks have a 
relatively high place in the legislative environment. Many 
of the policy decisions are worked out behind the scenes. 
In order to get the work accomplished it is presumed that 
the legislators will support each other, while the rhetoric 
is reserved for the benefit of the public. How are votes 
traded between legislators and their colleagues? Inter-party 
and intra-party trading of votes needs further 
investigation. 
Many studies have scrutinized the behavior of the 
legislators and the lobbyists. The role of the staff as an 
information base has also been studied. However, lobbyists 
gain access to the legislators through staff. What 
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strategies do lobbyists employ to woo the staff? How much 
information supplied by lobbyists is utilized by them? The 
relationship with staff and the lobbyists needs further 
investigation. It may be stronger than the relationship 
between the legislators and the lobbyists. 
The foremost limitation in this study is that the 
sample size of the legislators is relatively small. This 
may have resulted in the data being skewed. Secondly, the 
observations were conducted in the final days of the 
session. Most of the bills were in their third reading. 
Thus, I did not have the opportunity to observe the issues 
being developed and negotiated from introduction to the 
final vote. Thirdly, the observations are based from the 
interactions viewed from the public gallery. The 
perceptions gathered from a distance may not be accurate. 
However, data collected through observations has been 
sparingly reported. The primary source of data are the 
quantitative and the qualitative analysis that was gathered 
from the viewpoint of the representatives, and the 
lobbyists. Attempts have thus been made to bridge the 
inaccuracies that may have occurred. The exploratory 
emphasis, the descriptive analysis, and the spontaneous 
responses of the participants gives a comprehensive and 
detailed insight about the legislative culture and the 
decision making processes. 
Legislative Decision Making 66 
REFERENCES. 
Anderson, J. (1987) . Communication research: Issues 
and methods. McGraw Hill: New York. 
Bandura, A. (1991) . Self-regulatory mechanism 
governing the impact of social comparison on complex 
decision making. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology. 60. 941-951. 
Bimber, B. (1991). Information as a factor in 
congressional politics. Legislative Studies Quarterly. 
li.(4), 585-602. 
Bradac, J., Sandell, K., & Wenner, L.A. (1979) . The 
phemenology of evidence: The information-source utility in 
decision making. Communication Quarterly. 27(4), 35-46. 
Denzau, A. T., & Munger, M. C. (1986). Legislators 
and interest groups: How unorganized interests get 
represented. American Political Science Review. 80(1), 89-
105. 
Ellickson, M. C. (1992). Pathways to legislative 
success: A path analytic study of the Missouri House of 
Representatives. Legislative Studies Quarterly. 17(2), 285-
300. 
Enzle, M. E., Harvey, M. D., & Wright, E. F. (1992). 
Implicit role obligations versus social responsibility in 
constituency representation. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology. 62(2), 238-245. 
Feillin, A. (1966) . The functions of informal groups 
Legislative Decision Making 67 
in legislative institution. In H. Eulau's (eds). Political 
behavior in America: New directions. Random House: New 
York. 
Gelinas-Chebat, C., & Chebat, J. C. (1992). Effects 
of two characteristics on the attitudes toward advertising 
messages. The Journal of Social Psychology. 132(4), 447-
459. 
Gioia, D. A., Thomas, J. B., Clark, S. M., & 
Chittipedi, K. (1994). Symbolism and strategic change in 
academia: The dynamics of sensemaking and influence. 
Organization Science. 
~(3) f 363-383. 
Grenzke, J. M. (1983). Influence. change. and the 
legislative process. Greenwood Press: Connecticut. 
Hass, R. G. (1981). Effects of source characteristics 
on cognitive response and persuasion. In R. E. Petty, T. M. 
Ostram, & T. C. Brock's (eds) Cognitive responses in 
persuasion. Lawrence Erlbraum Associates: New Jersey. 
Jones, C. (1976). Why Congress can't do policy 
analysis (or words to that effect). Policy Analysis, 251-
264. 
Kingdon, J. W. (1973). Congressmen's voting 
decisions. Harper & Row: New York. 
Laczniak, R. N., & Muehling, D. D. (1993). The 
relationship between experimental manipulation and tests of 
theory in an advertising message involvement context. 
Legislative Decision Making 68 
Journal of Advertising. 22(3), 59-65. 
Langbein, L., & Lotwis, M.A. (1990). The political 
efficacy of lobbying and money: Gun control in the U. S. 
House, 1986. Legislative Study Quarterly. 15(3), 413-436. 
Lashbrook, V. J. (1975). Leadership emergence and 
source valence: Concepts in support of interaction theory 
and measurement. Human Communication Research. 1(4), 308-
315. 
Lin, N. (1971) . Information flow, influence flow and 
the decision-making process. Journalism Quarterly. 48(1), 
33-40. 
Lord, K. R., & Putrevu, S. (1993). Advertising and 
publicity: An information processing perspective. Journal 
of Economic Psychology. 14. 57-84. 
Meyer, K. (1980). Legislative Influence: Toward 
theory development through causal analysis. Legislative 
Studies Quarterly. 5(4), 563-582. 
Mondak, J. J. (1993). Public opinion and heuristic 
processing of source cues. Political Behavior. 15(2), 167-
190. 
Mooney, C. Z. (1991) . Information sources in state 
legislative decision making. Legislative Studies Quarterly. 
16(3) I 445-454, 
O'Hair, D., & Kreps, G. L. (Eds). (1990) . ]W~lied 
communication theory and research. Lawrence Elbraum 
Associates: New Jersey. 
Legislative Decision Making 69 
Petelle, J. L., & Maybee, R. (1974). Items of 
information retrieved as a function of cue system and 
topical area. Central States Speech Journal. 25(3), 95-101. 
Radford, K. J. (1989) Individual. and small group 
decisions. Captus University: Ontario. 
Ray, D. ( 19 8 2) . 
state legislatures. 
The sources of voting cues in three 
The Journal of Politics. 44. 1074-1087. 
Sabatier, P. & Whiteman D. (1985). Legislative 
decision making and substantive policy information: Models 
of information flow. Legislative Studies Quarterly. 10(3), 
395-420. 
Salisbury, R. H. (1969) . An exchange theory of 
interest groups. Midwest Journal of Political Science. 
UJ.l) I 1-32. 
Shull, S. A., & Vanderleeuw, J. M. ( 19 8 7 ) . What do 
key votes measure? Legislative Studies Quarterly. 12(4), 
573-581. 
Smith, R. A. (1984). Advocacy, Interpretation, and 
Influence in the U. S. Congress. The American Political 
Science Review. 78(1), 44-64. 
Songer, D. (1988) . The influence of empirical 
research: Committee vs. floor decision making. Legislative 
Studies Quarterly. 13(3), 375-390. 
Songer, D. R., Underwood, J.M., Dillon, S. G., 
Jameson, P. E., & Kite, D. W. (1985). Voting cues in two 
state legislatures: A further application of the Kingdon 
Legislative Decision Making 70 
Model. Social Science Quarterly. 66. 983-991. 
Swanson, D. L. (1976). Information utility: An 
alternative perspective in political communication. Central 
States Speech Journal. 25(3), 190-197. 
Ward, D. S. (1993). The continuing search for party 
influence in Congress: A view from the committees. 
Legislative Studies Quarterly. 18(2), 211-228. 
Zeigler, H., & Baer, M. (1969). Lobbying: 
interaction and influence in American state legislatures. 
Wordsworth Publishing Co., Inc.: CA. 
Zweir, R. (1979). The search of information: 
Specialists and nonspecialists in the U. S. House of 
Representatives. Legislative Studies Quarterly. 4(1), 31-
42. 
Legislative Decision Making 71 
APPENDIX A 
Dear Senator/Representative: 
Farida Kapasi. 
2417 Ladley Court, Apt. # 1 
Springfield, IL 62703. 
May 1995. 
I am a graduate student in Speech Communication at 
Eastern Illinois University. I am studying the 
communication processes involved in the Illinois Legislature 
as part of my thesis project. 
The information the public receives about the 
legislators is through the media. I would like to interview 
and find out about the daily activities in the life of a 
senator/representative. Enclosed please find a broad list of 
questions. Your response to them will enable me to research 
the information bases and the deliberations involved in the 
decision making process which is the purpose of my thesis. 
Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
Farida Kapasi. 
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APPENDIX B. 
Purpose: Information Bases in the Decision Making Process 
in the Illinois Legislature. 
LEGISLATORS. 
1. Your term in office? 
2. What motivated you to Join public office? 
3 How many committees and boards do you serve? 
4. How much daily mail, telephone, and faxes do you 
receive? 
S. What is the percentage of time that you spend on an 
average on a daily basis on the following activities: 
I) writing (ii) small group (iii) public speaking 
(iv) listening? 
Sa. Examples of different types of speaking: 
(I) interpersonal (ii) small group (iii) public 
speaking 
(iv) media. 
Sb. In terms of interpersonal speaking, the average amount 
of time spent with: 
(I) staff (ii) public (iii) other legislators (iv) 
others. 
6. How do you decide which issue needs priority attention? 
7. What are your sources of information and advice? 
8. How do you cope with the demands placed upon you by the 
external environment: 
e.g. new problems/new arena of conflict/press 
the constituents/the opposition from fellow 
legislators and the opposite party/pressure 
groups. 
9. What influence or motivates you to vote in a particular 
manner on a certain policy? Is it defined by events, 
previous experiences? 
10. What constraints do you have to observe when voting? 
11. Have you in this session changed your position from 
support to opposition and vice versa on a particular 
bill? 
If yes - which bill was this and what made you 
change your stance? 
12. How do you view your role in the decision making 
process? 
14. If the legislative process was to be defined in one 
word- what metaphor would you use as related to the 
legislature or life, in general? (e.g. tidal wave). 
lS. What are your aspirations and goals? 
16. Do you intend to stand for reelection next term? 
Legislative Decision Making 73 
APPENDIX C. 
LOBBYISTS: 
1. When the General Assembly is in session, how often do 
you come to the Capitol? 
2. Do you travel to Springfield every session or do you 
have your headquarters in Springfield? 
3. How do you view your role in the legislative process? 
4. Does your presence provide an impetus/an initiative for 
the activities in the lawmaking process? 
5. What protocol/red tape do you need to observe to get a 
legislators attention? 
6. What are the typical responses you receive when you 
contact a legislator? 
7. How do you view the entire proceedings -- the 
controversies, the debate on the floor? 
8. Do you consider it as time consuming? 
9. What strategies do you need to employ to ensure that 
your interests are articulated and protected? 
10. How many telephone calls, mail, faxes - do you need to 
send to ensure legislator's attention? 
11. What cues would you be alert or be sensitive to that 
would make you aware that your group's interest are 
being threatened or favored? 
12. Does your group endorse candidates during election 
time? 
13. What factors do you consider when you ask a legislator 
to sponsor your bill? 
14. What are your views on the 
Republican party. 
Democratic party. 
15. What are the procedures you need to follow if your bill 
has passed/failed? 
16. The general public has a particular view about the 
lobbyists, what is your response to them? 
